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Abstract 
Using data from 1997 to 2008, this paper investigates the cost efficiency of the Ghanaian banking 
sector after financial liberalisation. The Ghanaian bank with the highest efficiency score is found to be 
operating at maximum possible efficiency. The average bank is however operating at high costs. 
Despite mixed evidence in the literature, there is the received wisdom that most cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions post-liberalisation result in failure due to factors that include poor credit quality, 
inadequate generation of fee income, and poor customer mix. In Ghana, the situation is different 
because the only foreign-acquired bank had prior knowledge of the local conditions and has managed 
to utilise this advantage, coupled with redundancy programmes and layoffs and without branch 
expansion following the acquisition, to operate at a relatively high level of cost efficiency.  
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1. Introduction 
A considerable amount of attention has been devoted to the efficiency of financial institutions over the 
past few decades. As noted by Berger and DeYoung (1997), the strand of research which investigates 
the productive efficiency of financial institutions with respect to the ‘best practice’ efficient frontier 
argues that the average firm incurs high costs and generates low profits. The central purpose of this 
study is to examine the effects of financial sector reforms on the efficiency of the Ghanaian banking 
system, and to evaluate the efficacy of the reform policy. 
Given that financial liberalisation has been introduced in many economies over the past few decades, 
studies on banking system efficiency suggest the need to investigate the operational inefficiencies in 
African reforming economies. The reforms introduced in these countries have allowed interest rates to 
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be set by the market, and have permitted banks to lend on commercial considerations alone. It is 
expected that these practices would lead to greater competition amongst banks whose objective, in a 
liberalised economy, is to maximise profit. Proponents of liberalisation suggest that the banking system 
will become more efficient through competition, but the evidence is mixed (Note 1). There are different 
ways of measuring efficiency, and the measures are not necessarily correlated. For example, an 
examination of Korean data (Cho, 1988) suggests that, following liberalisation, allocative efficiency 
was improved. This implies that the rate of return from investment in different sectors to which the 
banks continued lending following liberalisation were equalised. This indicates a better allocation of 
loans to maximise profit. Amsden and Euh (1993) point out that Korea has achieved its objectives of 
modernising its financial sector, not because it relied exclusively on market forces to achieve desired 
goals, but rather by principally creating institutions or modelling old ones. The authors assert that the 
functional efficiency of Korean banks may be considered the most important performance-effect that 
the first round liberalisation achieved, and that, this type of efficiency has tended to be less heavily 
emphasised than allocative efficiency by advocates of financial liberalisation. Considering the high 
operating cost of Ghanaian banks, this argument is developed examining how functioning institutions 
have affected the efficiency of the Ghanaian banking system. More specifically, it is aimed to 
investigate how the market structure and regulatory framework under which the banks operate affect 
their efficiency.  
Of particular concern is the received wisdom in the literature that most mergers and acquisitions 
post-liberalisation result in failure. Whereas some of the failures have been attributed to factors that 
include poor credit quality and inadequate generation of fee income, resulting in additional costs 
generated by the merger (Knapp et al., 2005), others have been attributed to poor customer mix post 
acquisition (Havrylchyk, 2006). The experience is however different in the Ghanaian context because 
the only foreign-acquired bank had prior knowledge of the local conditions and has managed to utilise 
this advantage, coupled with redundancy programmes and layoffs and without branch expansion 
following the acquisition, to operate at a relatively high level of cost efficiency.  
This study contributes to the established literature on the impact of financial liberalisation in Africa. 
Studies that have investigated banking system efficiency in both developed and emerging economies 
have yielded mixed results, due to different macroeconomic and sectoral conditions prior to the 
financial reforms. Many of these studies have focused on periods when some of these reforms had not 
been fully implemented. The present study examines a period following the implementation of all of 
the phases of the liberalisation process in the Ghanaian banking industry. This should help critically 
assess the benefits and non-benefits of the reforms. The results presented in this paper are among the 
earliest indications of the effects that financial sector reforms have had on the banking system 
efficiency in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature 
surrounding the research topic. The empirical model employed is described in section 3, alongside 
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description of data used in the study. Section 4 presents the results and discussion of the study, followed 
by the conclusion in section 5. 
 
2. Financial Liberalisation and Bank Efficiency: The Literature 
The efficiency literature has grown rapidly over the past few decades. The vast majority of the studies 
covers the US and European countries (See, for example, Berger & Humphrey, 1997; Goddard et al., 
2007; Asaftei, 2008; Beijnen & Bolt, 2009).  
Efficiency studies on developing economies are less plentiful. The majority of the studies of emerging 
market banking systems after financial liberalisation refer to Asian countries including India (Das & 
Ghosh, 2006), Singapore (Rezvanian & Mehdian, 2002), Hong Kong (Drake et al., 2006), Malaysia 
(Okuda et al., 2002) and China (Berger et al., 2009). Cross-country studies of Asian banking system 
efficiency have also been undertaken (Williams & Nguyen, 2005).  
Efficiency studies have also been reported for a number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as 
well as the Commonwealth of Independent States (Bonin et al., 2005; Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al., 
2009). In sub-Saharan Africa, bank efficiency studies after financial liberalisation cover economies 
including Uganda (Hauner & Peiris, 2005) and Botswana (Moffat & Valadkhani, 2008).  
It is expected that financial sector reforms should increase competition, leading to improvements in 
bank efficiency. The empirical evidence has however been mixed. In a study of the Ugandan banking 
system between 1999 and 2004, Hauner and Peiris (2005) find that the level of competition has 
increased significantly and has been associated with an improvement in efficiency following 
liberalisation. Ataullah and Le (2006) report an improvement in the efficiency of Indian banks, 
especially foreign-owned banks, after financial reforms. Havrylchyk (2006) however finds that 
efficiency has not improved in the Polish banking industry between 1997 and 2001.  
The comparison of efficiency between foreign- and domestic-owned banks suggests that foreign banks 
in emerging market economies have been able to utilise their advantages by achieving higher efficiency 
than their domestic peers (Hasan & Marton, 2003; Bonin et al., 2005). Hauner and Peiris (2005) show 
that on average foreign-owned banks are more efficient than domestic banks in Uganda. Moffat and 
Valadkhani (2008) find that foreign institutions exhibit higher levels of efficiency than public 
institutions in Botswana. In the case of the Polish banking industry, Havrylchyk (2006) finds that 
greenfield banks have been able to achieve higher levels of efficiency than their domestic peers, whilst 
foreign banks that acquired domestic firms had not succeeded in improving their efficiency.  
Empirical studies on the relationship between bank size and efficiency have also produced mixed 
results of the impact of financial liberalisation on bank efficiency. Hauner and Peiris (2005) find larger 
banks to be more efficient than smaller banks in the Ugandan banking system. Moffat and Valadkhani 
(2008) show that small and large institutions have higher levels of efficiency than medium-sized banks 
in Botswana. 
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3. Methodology and Data 
3.1 The Cost Efficiency Model 
Under a liberalised financial system, banks are expected to realise efficiency gains via reorganisation 
with “prices reducing towards production costs under the pressure of competition” (Gardener et al., 
2001). Operating cost (OC) is used as dependent variable in the efficiency model and this variable is 
proxied as the sum of personnel and other non-interest expenses.  
The intermediation approach to modelling bank production is employed. This approach assumes banks 
to perform an intermediation role between depositors and borrowers. From this perspective, banks are 
considered to be intermediators of financial services that purchase inputs in order to generate earning 
assets as output (Sealey & Lindley, 1977).  
More precisely, the value-added approach to the intermediation process is used, and estimate efficiency 
from the cost function by specifying two outputs (loans and deposits) and two inputs (price of labour 
and price of deposits). These categories of loans (LN) and deposits (DP) are considered as the key 
outputs, because they generate the great majority of value added. The price of labour is proxied as the 
ratio of personnel expenses to total assets, whereas the price of deposits is proxied as the ratio of 
interest expenses to the value of total deposits. These two variables enter the regression as the ratio of 
labour cost to the price of deposits (w). The dependent variable (OC) also enters the regression divided 
by the price of deposits.  
A time trend variable (T) is included to account for the effects of technological change, together with 
other factors such as regulatory change. This captures the missing time dimension that is not explicitly 
modelled in the cost function.  
Three bank-specific indicators that capture credit, capital and liquidity risk are also included to control 
for differences in the banks’ risk profile, since measured efficiency may reflect variation in risk-taking 
strategies across banks. 
Credit risk (CRD) is measured as the ratio of provisions for bad and doubtful debts to gross loans; 
capital risk (CAP) as the ratio of shareholders’ funds to total assets; and liquidity risk (LIQ) as the ratio 
of liquid assets to total bank liabilities.  
On the basis of the aforementioned variable definitions, the preferred cost efficiency model is specified 
using a two-output, two-input translog functional form. The efficiency estimate is derived from a cost 
function (1): 
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where for the i-th bank in the t-th time period, ,ln itOC ,ln itw ,ln itLN and itDPln denote the 
natural logarithms of operating cost, input prices of labour and deposits, as well as loans and deposits 
for bank outputs, respectively; T  captures the effects of technical progress (including linear and 
quadratic time trend, as well as trend interaction terms); ,itCRD ,itCAP and itLIQ  
represent the 
natural logarithms of the variables controlling for credit, capital and liquidity risk; and 
itv  
is a 
random noise variable that is distributed independently and identically according to standard normal 
distribution, whereas 
itu
 
is a non-negative random variable that captures the effects of inefficiency 
and is assumed to be independently but not identically distributed according to a truncated-normal 
distribution.  
3.2 Correlates of Bank Inefficiency 
After estimating cost efficiency measures for Ghanaian banks, one may investigate further the factors 
that are correlated with bank inefficiency. To do this, the conditional mean model of Battese and Coelli 
(1995) is employed, which allows in a one-step procedure estimation of the cost function and 
identification of the correlates of bank inefficiency. Inefficiency scores are first derived from the model, 
and then, express these scores as an explicit function of a vector of predictor variables which in this 
case measure characteristics of functioning institutions.  
The institutional variables employed to investigate the factors that are correlated with bank inefficiency 
include bank governance, competition, and bank size. These are discussed below. 
3.2.1 Bank Governance 
The issue of bank governance has been of concern to researchers since financial liberalisation was 
introduced in a number of reforming economies (Note 2). This has resulted in a proliferation of 
efficiency studies on bank ownership in recent decades. Causes of changes in ownership and other 
organisational restructuring include both domestic and foreign mergers and acquisitions, privatisation, 
restructuring of distressed banks, and bank closures.  
The approach to measuring bank governance has varied with respect to the economies concerned, 
managerial structure and data availability. According to Berger et al. (2005), it is important to control 
for all of the major governance changes that affect the performance of an economy’s banking sector in 
order to avoid misspecification, bias and misleading results. For this reason, several authors have 
developed a framework that captures the static, selection, and dynamic effects of changes in bank 
governance on bank performance. Governance changes are usually specified using dummy variables. 
Due to data constraints, the method applied in this study only includes three static variables for 
foreign-owned, private domestic-owned and state-owned banks; one selection variable for cross-border 
merger and acquisition; and two dynamic variables for the selection dummy that include both short- 
and long-term performance effects for the bank concerned (see below).  
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It is important to note that all the state-owned banks in Ghana underwent some form of restructuring 
during the reform period, and this included recapitalisation from public funds, the removal from 
balance sheets of non-performing assets, and the appointments of new boards of directors and senior 
executives. As mentioned earlier, the limited data sample for this study does not permit to investigate 
the selection and dynamic effects of the state-owned banks from the period these changes occurred. 
Hence, these changes are treated as long-run static effects, because the government remained the 
majority equity stake holder in these banks during the study period.  
Due to the aforementioned data constraints, I am unable to measure the selection and dynamic effects 
of foreign- and private domestic-owned banks from the period the government relinquished its part or 
entire minority shareholding in them. For this reason, I also treat these changes as long-run static 
effects in cases where foreign or private domestic owners retained majority shareholdings throughout 
the sample period. Many studies in the academic literature have applied these methods to investigate 
the performance effects of different types of bank ownership (see, for example, Fries & Taci, 2005; 
Lensink et al., 2008). 
Following Nakane and Weintraub (2005) and Williams and Nguyen (2005), one exit variable is also 
included which identifies two state-owned banks that were liquidated. Unlike most ownership studies, 
this paper follows the approach of Fries and Taci (2005) by introducing two entry variables that capture 
newly established foreign and domestic banks that entered the market during and after the reforms.  
Initially, I focus on the static effects of foreign-ownership (STATIC_FOR), private domestic-ownership 
(STATIC_DOM) and state-ownership (STATIC_STA) on the bank efficiency. Static dummy variables are 
created for these banks and assume that they have not undergone any major change in ownership 
composition over the sample period, and that they were still active at the end of the sample period. 
These dummy variables take the value of one for the banks concerned for all time periods, and zero for 
other periods and for all other banks. 
The literature suggests that the efficiency of foreign-owned banks in emerging economies differs from 
both private domestic-owned and state-owned banks. Foreign banks are assumed to possess superior 
management practices and technological advantage over local banks, and as such, are expected to 
capitalise on their advantages and exhibit higher efficiency levels than their local peers (Claessens et al., 
2001). Following the literature on foreign banking, a bank is defined as foreign if more than 50% of its 
shares are owned by non-domestic residents. A static dummy variable is specified for foreign 
ownership (STATIC_FOR) that takes the value of one for all periods, and zero otherwise.  
Contrary to the above discussion on foreign ownership, it has also been suggested that the opening of 
financial markets to foreign competition may increase the cost of domestic banks’ operations. Stiglitz 
(1993) as cited in Claessens et al. (2001) discusses the effects of foreign bank entry on the costs of 
domestic banks, local entrepreneurs and the government. It is however possible that domestic banks in 
developing countries have informational advantages over their foreign peers, and as such, could operate 
at higher efficiency levels than foreign-owned banks. Moreover, domestic banks are expected to 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/asir             Applied Science and Innovative Research                  Vol. 3, No. 3, 2019 
196 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
replicate and assimilate the modern banking technology and skills introduced by foreign banks, which 
as a consequence, should improve their efficiency. A bank is defined as private domestic if more than 
50% of its shares are owned by domestic residents. A static dummy variable is specified for private 
domestic ownership (STATIC_DOM) that takes the value of one for all periods, and zero otherwise.  
State-owned banks are generally considered to be less efficient than privately-owned banks (Beck et al., 
2005a, 2005b; Nakane & Weintraub, 2005). In a case where government banks account for a substantial 
share of an entire banking market, non-commercial criteria may frequently be used to allocate credit, 
with resulting upward pressure on cost inefficiency. The argument behind the inefficiency of 
government banks is framed along the three alternative theories of state ownership: social, political, 
and agency (Sapienza, 2004). While the social view of state ownership assumes that state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) are created to address market failure in financial and credit markets (Megginson, 
2005), the political view assumes state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to be inefficient due to deliberate 
policies of politicians of diverting resources to their supporters (La Porta et al., 2002). The agency view 
on the other hand supports the idea of the social view that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are created 
to maximise social welfare, but are subject to an inherent tendency to generate corruption and 
misallocation (Banerjee, 1997; Hart et al., 1997).  
After major financial sector reforms, one would expect the inefficiencies in state-owned banks to 
decline through the strengthening of operational procedures and the existence of improved supervisory 
and regulatory systems. A bank is defined as state-owned if more than 50% of its shares are held by the 
government. A static dummy variable is specified for state ownership (STATE_STA) that takes the value 
of one for all periods, and zero otherwise.  
During a period of liberalisation, it is common to observe banks withdrawing from the market by 
means of liquidation or through the change of activities from either a specialised operation into 
something else, or transfer of their assets and liabilities to other banks through merger and acquisition. 
In Ghana, due to insolvency, a small number of state-owned banks were liquidated during the reform 
period. For this reason, exit dummy variables are defined for liquidated state-owned banks (EXIT), and 
specify these dummies to take the value of one for the closed banks during all the periods for which 
they are present in the sample, and zero otherwise. 
As governments remove controls on entry, it is common for new foreign and private domestic banks to 
enter the industry. The Ghanaian banking system is seen to be expanding in numbers as new banks find 
their way into the reforming economy. Entry dummy variables are measured for both newly established 
foreign (ENTRY_FOR) and private domestic (ENTRY_DOM) banks, and specify separately these 
dummies to take the value of one for all the periods in which they are present in the sample, and zero 
otherwise. 
Furthermore, mergers and acquisitions involving banks have been common in developing countries 
during and after periods of financial reform. Due to data constraints, I am unable to investigate the only 
domestic merger and acquisition deal that took place during the reform period. However, the same bank 
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(Social Security Bank of Ghana) that underwent domestic merger and acquisition was, in 2004, merged 
with and acquired by Societele Generale of France under a new name, SG-SSB Ltd, with 51% share 
ownership. This is the only cross-border merger and acquisition recorded in the Ghanaian banking 
industry since the reforms took place, and the data sample permits investigation of its inefficiency 
effects. Selection and dynamic dummy variables are created for the merged and acquired bank.  
The selection dummy variables are created for banks that have been involved in some form of 
ownership change over the sample period. For this reason, a dummy variable (SELECT_FOR) is 
specified to take the value of one for all periods of a bank that underwent cross-border merger and 
acquisition, and zero otherwise.  
The dynamic dummy variables on the other hand are created for those banks for which the selection 
dummies take the value of one to date the exact moment when the ownership change took place, and 
zero otherwise. In other words, the dynamic dummy variables (DYNAM)_ST) take the value of one for 
the bank concerned for all the time periods following a given intervention, and zero for the periods 
prior to the intervention and for all periods for a bank that has not undergone any ownership change. 
This treatment is assumed to identify the short-term performance effect of the intervention. 
The dynamic dummy variable is assumed to capture the once-and-for-all changes associated to a 
certain intervention. In addition to this level effect, however, Nakane and Weintraub (2005) note that 
the effect of intervention may be realised cumulatively over a period of time. For this reason, an 
additional dummy variable (DYNAMIC_LT) is created to measure the time that has lapsed since the 
intervention occurred. Under normal circumstances, the dynamic time dummy variable takes the value 
of one in the year when the intervention occurred, the value two in the following year, and so on. 
However, all observations in the year when the intervention took place are excluded from the sample. 
Thus, the dynamic time dummy variable, which reflects a long-term performance effect, starts with 
zero prior to the intervention and two for the second year following the ownership change. The 
intuition behind this treatment as noted by Nakane and Weintraub (2005) is to control for noise and 
some of the short-term transaction costs associated with the intervention. This may include 
discontinuities in previous policies, adoption of new strategies, as well as costs that are related to legal 
issues, consultancy services, due diligence, and any costs that may be associated with the corporate 
change. Each dummy equals zero for all periods for banks that did not experience any cross-border 
merger and acquisition. 
Based on the aforementioned definitions for bank ownership and corporate changes, it is expected that 
the various measures will explain the variations in the cost-efficient frontier. This will allow assessing 
the effect of institutional differences on the efficiency estimate. Eventually, one is able to examine 
which of these ownership effects dominates the efficiency of the Ghanaian banking system after 
financial liberalisation. 
3.2.2 Competition 
Proponents of financial liberalisation suggest that as a consequence the banking system will become 
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more efficient through competition. A considerable number of studies have suggested that better 
institutions will promote greater competition in an economy. Several developing countries have taken 
measures to lower entry barriers, abolish interest rate ceilings, and privatise government-owned 
financial institutions. Some advocates of universal banking have also argued that competition can be 
stimulated by despecialising development financial institutions (DFIs) and commercial banks. From 
this perspective, the Ghanaian authority has replaced the 3-pillar banking model (development, 
merchant and commercial banking) with universal banking (Note 3). The motivation is to level the 
playing field, and open up the system to competition, product innovation and entry. A dummy variable 
(UNIVERSAL) is set to take a value of one from the period when universal banking was introduced, and 
zero otherwise (Note 4).  
3.2.3 Bank Size 
Variation in the location of the cost-efficient frontier is allowed by bank size. Banks with larger asset 
holdings may operate more efficiently than their counterparts due to the use of different production 
technology. The evidence in the academic literature is mixed and inconclusive on this issue, as previous 
empirical studies have yielded different results.  
It is also possible that banks of different sizes serve different groups of customers, and as a result, may 
face different levels of competition. From this perspective, the size indicator is expected to explain the 
efficiency of banks. Bank size (LOGASSETS) is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. 
3.2.4 Other Control Variables 
As a robustness check, inflation (INFLATION) and the Bank of Ghana average quarterly discount rate 
(DISRATE) are used as macroeconomic indicators to establish whether these additional variables 
influence the estimated relationships between efficiency and the main variables of interest, which in 
this case, are the indicators of bank governance, competition and bank size. Whereas high discount 
rates can increase the interest costs of banking operations and reduce their efficiency levels, inflation 
reduces the real value of banks’ capital and increases their operating costs. Inflation is measured as the 
annual percentage change in the consumer price index (CPI). 
The following regression model is estimated for the determinants of cost efficiency in the Ghanaian 
banking system: 
itititit DOMENTRYFORENTRYEXITEFF __ 3210  
ititit STASTATICDOMSTATICFORSTATIC ___ 654    
ititit LTDYNAMSTDYNAMFORSELECT ___ 987    
titit DISRATELOGASSETSUNIVERSAL 121110    
   
itt wINFLATION  13                         (2) 
3.3 Data Sources and Classification 
The data for this study were sourced from Bank of Ghana (BOG), which publishes balance sheet and 
income statement data for various Ghanaian banks. The dataset is an unbalanced panel that covers 28 
banks over the period 1997-2008 with a sample size of 222 observations. The unbalanced panel dataset 
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varies from 14 banks in 1999 to 25 banks in 2008. The study period has been chosen to reflect the 
post-liberalisation phase of the financial sector reforms period (Tables 1 and 2 report the summary 
statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis). 
The macroeconomic variables (discount rates and inflation) are obtained from the IMF International 
Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook databases. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Cost Efficiency Estimation for the Period 
1997-2008 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
ln OC 222 14.2096 1.4381 9.3709 17.0711 
ln w 222 3.3974 0.8028 1.4005 6.2904 
ln LN 222 12.4591 1.8057 7.3542 16.2230 
ln DP 222 12.9770 1.5782 8.5796 16.1151 
1/2 (ln w)² 222 6.0920 2.7928 0.9807 19.7846 
1/2 (ln LN)² 222 79.2374 21.8185 27.0419 131.5935 
1/2 (ln DP)² 222 85.4414 20.0878 36.8047 129.8474 
ln LN ln DP 222 164.3029 41.4215 63.0958 261.4351 
ln w ln LN 222 41.8846 10.0399 15.2941 68.9730 
ln w ln DP 222 43.7684 10.4470 14.2039 74.5123 
T ln w 222 23.0004 10.9713 1.4005 53.3174 
T ln LN 222 91.5563 51.7788 7.4804 194.6764 
T ln DP 222 94.9057 52.3931 8.9828 193.3806 
T 222 7.0496 3.5098 1.0000 12.0000 
1/2 T² 222 30.9797 24.0817 0.5000 72.0000 
CRD 222 0.1161 0.1387 0.0093 0.8749 
CAP 222 0.1159 0.2861 -0.3474 1.8148 
LIQ 222 1.1130 0.2177 0.1898 3.1620 
Source: Bank of Ghana (BOG) database. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Bank Inefficiency Correlates for the Period 
1997-2008 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
EXIT 222 0.0180 0.1333 0.0000 1.0000 
ENTRY_FOR 222 0.2703 0.4451 0.0000 1.0000 
ENTRY_DOM 222 0.3333 0.4725 0.0000 1.0000 
STATIC_FOR 222 0.1081 0.3112 0.0000 1.0000 
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STATIC_DOM 222 0.0541 0.2266 0.0000 1.0000 
STATIC_STA 222 0.1622 0.3694 0.0000 1.0000 
SELECT_FOR 222 0.0541 0.2266 0.0000 1.0000 
DYNAM_ST 222 0.0270 0.1625 0.0000 1.0000 
DYNAM_LT 222 0.0901 0.6317 0.0000 6.0000 
UNIVERSAL 222 0.5676 0.4965 0.0000 1.0000 
LOGASSETS 222 13.4419 1.5678 8.8352 16.6113 
DISRATE 222 23.5256 9.8381 12.7500 45.0000 
INFLAION 222 17.9315 6.9548 10.1510 32.9060 
Source: Bank of Ghana (BOG) database. IMF, IFS/WEO databases. 
 
Out of the 28 banks with 222 observations in the sample, 21.43% were identified as active without 
experiencing any corporate ownership change. Of these banks, 7.14% were identified as foreign-owned, 
whereas 3.57% and 10.71% were identified as private domestic and state-owned banks, respectively. 
The selection governance indicator employed in this study identified only one type of ownership 
change, which is mainly of cross-border merger and acquisition.  
The financial sector reform process has led to a substantial increase in bank entry. The entry 
governance indicators show two types of change in this study. The number of banks identified as new 
foreign entrants constitutes 39.29% of the sample, whereas new private domestic entrants account for 
28.57% of the total. Overall, 67.86% of the sample are classified as new entrants.  
Two state-owned banks were closed by means of liquidation.  
 
4. Empirical Results  
Cost efficiency frontier and bank inefficiency correlates were estimated on a panel of unbalanced 
sample. The results show a number of relevant implications of the cost function of Ghanaian banks and 
their correlates with inefficiency. Tables 3 to 5 report the results of the estimates. Robustness analysis 
are also conducted on the main findings, and the results are unaffected. Table A.1 in Appendix reports 
the results of the robust estimates. 
4.1 Average Cost Efficiencies 
Tables 3 and 4 report the average measured bank efficiency scores by year at the sample means for 
banks classified by size, and by ownership status, respectively. The efficiency estimates take a 
maximum value of 1, indicating the best practice bank in the sample; and a minimum value of 0, 
corresponding to the most inefficient bank. 
The results in Table 3 are reported by bank size and year. There appear to be fluctuations in the mean 
efficiency scores in the entire banking industry. Apart from the mean efficiency score for large banks 
which fell marginally from 87.44% in 1997 to 86.09% in 2008, all the other banks classified according 
to sizes managed to improve their mean efficiency scores over the same period. On average, large and 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/asir             Applied Science and Innovative Research                  Vol. 3, No. 3, 2019 
201 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
medium banks appear to be more cost efficient than small banks. Overall, the results suggest a mean 
efficiency score of 0.7553 for the full sample. This suggests that, when evaluated at the sample mean 
data point, the average bank is 75.53% efficient, or equivalently incurs 24.47% higher costs than the 
best practice bank facing the same conditions. On economic grounds, the mean cost inefficiency level 
suggests that, given their output level and mix, the average Ghanaian bank needs to reduce its 
production costs by 24.5% in order to use its inputs as efficiently as the most efficient Ghanaian bank. 
This finding is interpreted as evidence of only limited gains in managerial efficiency having arisen 
from financial liberalisation.  
The results in Table 4 are reported by governance indicators and year. Apart from the mean efficiency 
score for foreign banks, STATIC_FOR, which fell marginally from 91.85% in 1997 to 90.22% in 2008, 
all the other banks classified by governance indicators appear to have improved their mean efficiency 
scores over the same period. On average, the only bank selected for cross-border merger and 
acquisition, SELECT_FOR, seems to be more cost efficient than banks classified according to any of 
the governance indicators. This is followed by foreign banks, STATIC_FOR, and state-owned banks, 
STATIC_STA. Both new and established private domestic banks, ENTRY_DOM and STATIC_DOM, 
exhibit the lowest average cost efficiency measures. New foreign banks, ENTRY_FOR, also appear to 
be better at managing their costs than private domestic institutions. 
 
Table 3. Efficiency Scores by Bank Size and Year, 1997-2008 
Period Large banks Medium banks Small banks Full sample 
1997 0.8744 0.7644 0.6249 0.7311 
1998 0.8703 0.9006 0.6281 0.7387 
1999 0.8744 0.7471 0.6452 0.7461 
2000 0.8630 0.9231 0.6686 0.7528 
2001 0.8674 0.9301 0.6829 0.7583 
2002 0.8774 0.9083 0.6919 0.7654 
2003 0.8757 0.9398 0.6891 0.7605 
2004 0.8850 0.9180 0.6981 0.7675 
2005 0.8451 0.8022 0.6703 0.7391 
2006 0.8501 0.8103 0.7250 0.7633 
2007 0.8549 0.8306 0.7269 0.7651 
2008 0.8609 0.8624 0.7510 0.7754 
Average 0.8666 0.8614 0.6835 0.7553 
Note. Large banks: assets > 10% of industry total assets. Medium banks: 10% > assets > 5% of industry 
total assets. Small banks: assets < 5% of industry total assets. 
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Table 4. Efficiency Scores by Governance Indicators and Year, 1997-2008 
Period Entry_For Entry_Dom Static_For Static_Dom Static_Sta Select_For 
1997 0.6740 0.6331 0.9185 0.5676 0.7591 0.9288 
1998 0.6826 0.6433 0.9211 0.5790 0.7664 0.9354 
1999 0.6911 0.6533 0.9237 0.5902 0.7736 0.9378 
2000 0.7152 0.6777 0.9262 0.6012 0.7805 0.9390 
2001 0.7232 0.6945 0.9286 0.6121 0.7873 0.9499 
2002 0.7310 0.7034 0.9310 0.6227 0.7939 0.9572 
2003 0.7387 0.6905 0.9333 0.6332 0.8003 0.9634 
2004 0.7461 0.6994 0.9355 0.6434 0.8066 0.9712 
2005 0.7165 0.6734 0.8917 0.6214 0.7728 0.9465 
2006 0.7827 0.6939 0.8953 0.6320 0.7799 0.9588 
2007 0.7727 0.7028 0.8988 0.6423 0.7867 0.9589 
2008 0.7867 0.7115 0.9022 0.6524 0.7934 0.9676 
Average 0.7301 0.6814 0.9172 0.6165 0.7834 0.9512 
Note. See Table 5.2 for variable definitions of governance indicators. 
 
4.2 Bank Inefficiency Correlates 
Employing the conditional mean model of Battese and Coelli (1995), factors that are correlated with 
bank inefficiency are investigated in the Ghanaian banking sector. In the model, (in)efficiency is 
derived from the cost function in equation (1) and subsequently expressed as a function of a vector of 
predictor variables. The results of this investigation, which include governance indicators, competition, 
and bank size, are presented in Table 5. 
4.2.1 Bank Governance 
The estimate in Table 5 shows that apart from the two dynamic variables (DYNAM_ST and 
DYNAM_LT), all the governance indicators have a statistically significant relationship with cost 
(in)efficiency. The omitted dummy variable among our governance indicators is bank exit, EXIT. Thus, 
the cost (in)efficiency with respect to bank governance is measured relative to this category. As 
expected, the results show that the two state-owned banks selected for closure were less cost efficient 
than other banks in the sample. The closure decision made by Bank of Ghana appears to be justified on 
cost efficiency grounds. 
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Table 5. Parameter Estimates of Bank Inefficiency Correlates 
Variable Parameter Coefficient Standard error T-statistic 
Constant      α0 -2.5433* 1.3078 -1.94 
Bank governance 
    
ENTRY_FOR      δ2 -0.5271*** 0.2008 -2.63 
ENTRY_DOM      δ3 -0.5056** 0.2161 -2.34 
STATIC_FOR      δ4 -0.7250*** 0.2413 -3.01 
STATIC_DOM      δ5 -0.3963** 0.1981 -2.00 
STATIC_STA      δ6 -0.6352** 0.2477 -2.56 
SELECT_FOR      δ7 -0.7865*** 0.2571 -3.06 
DYNAM_ST      δ8 0.0099 0.1163 0.09 
DYNAM_LT      δ9 0.0028 0.0272 0.10 
Competition 
    
UNIVERSAL      δ10 0.0225 0.0386 0.58 
Bank Size 
    
LOGASSETS      δ11 -0.8066*** 0.0671 -12.02 
Statistic 
    
Gamma       γ 0.9274*** 0.2120 4.3745 
LR-test      Ψ 70.3371*** 
  
No. of obs.      N 222 
  
Note. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
All the newly established private banks, ENTRY_DOM and ENTRY_FOR, that entered the market 
operate at relatively high levels of cost efficiency. The effect of each category also appears to be very 
similar in magnitude.  
The lower cost efficiency of the newly established foreign banks, ENTRY_FOR, relative to established 
foreign banks, STATIC_FOR, can be traced from one important factor. In attempting to establish their 
presence in the Ghanaian banking industry, many of the new foreign banks poached staff from 
established financial institutions (both banks and non-banks), by offering high salary and incentive 
packages. This was especially common among newly established Nigerian banks that entered the 
market from 2005 onwards. A large number of senior management and ordinary staff were poached, 
especially during the period 2006-2007. Staff turnover in the banking industry was high during this 
period. New staff that had no prior experience in banking, and had not been poached from elsewhere, 
received twice the salary earned by their peers in other established financial institutions. Apart from 
generous incentive packages, most new foreign banks were willing to offer high salary packages, which 
may as a consequence, have made them less cost efficient than the established foreign banks. 
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The ability to pay high salaries arose from the fact that the newly established foreign banks had support 
from their parent companies. Concerns were raised as to how long this practice could be sustained. One 
would expect that the human capital investment made by the newly established foreign banks would 
eventually pay off, considering the fact that they had managed to bring into their teams a considerable 
number of staff and management with knowledge of local conditions in the banking industry. However, 
the unreasonable targets set by some newly established foreign banks forced a quite number of their 
workers to resign prematurely, as they were unable to meet their targets, and saw their salaries and 
incentives reduced accordingly. This added to the relatively high labour turnover in the banking 
industry during this period. Newly established foreign banks had to raise their game in order to 
compete with established banks. In spite of these efforts, the results of this study suggest they have not 
achieved the same levels of cost efficiency as their established foreign peers.  
Among the group of static governance indicators, the result shows that established foreign banks, 
STATIC_FOR, are more cost efficient than state-owned, STATIC_STA, and established private domestic, 
STATIC_DOM, banks; with the latter showing the lowest average cost efficiency in the Ghanaian 
banking sector. This is partially consistent with theory which assumes that state-owned banks in 
developing countries are less cost efficient than their peers due to pervasive market inefficiencies and 
outmoded banking practices. In the Ghanaian context, our result shows that state-owned banks are 
more cost efficient than their established private domestic peers. 
Despite the inefficiencies of government banks that are widely documented in developing economies, 
after the three phases of liberalisation in the Ghanaian banking sector, state-owned banks appear to 
have improved their efficiency levels according to the results reported in Table 5. There is also 
evidence that state-owned banks are more cost efficient than either foreign-owned, ENTRY_FOR, or 
private domestic, ENTRY_DOM, banks that have just entered the market. This suggests that a 
strengthening of operational procedures, and the existence of improved supervisory and regulatory 
systems, have helped to reduce the cost inefficiency of state-owned banks. 
It is, however, noteworthy that the established foreign banks, STATIC_FOR, exhibit the highest average 
cost efficiency among the groups reported in Table 5. All of these banks were established during the 
colonial period; notably, Barclays and Standard Chartered. From this perspective, it appears that as a 
result of maintaining a long-term presence in the Ghanaian banking sector, these banks have managed 
to overcome the informational disadvantages they might have experienced with respect to local banks. 
In geographical areas where they had consistently operated inefficiently, these banks have closed down 
their branches, despite adverse public opinion.  
The higher cost efficiency of established foreign banks relative to domestic banks is also consistent 
with the theory that suggests foreign banks in developing economies have advantages over their 
domestic counterparts, such as superior management practices and technological processes (Claessens 
et al., 2001). As private domestic banks replicate and assimilate the modern banking technology and 
skills introduced by foreign banks, it is expected that this group of local banks would combine the 
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modern practices with knowledge of local conditions they have to improve their efficiency levels.  
The coefficient on banks selected for cross-border merger and acquisition, SELECT_FOR, is highly 
significant at the 1% level with a coefficient of 0.7865. This suggests that the only foreign-acquired 
bank has operated at a relatively high level of cost efficiency. This has been driven mainly by 
redundancy programmes and layoffs, and without branch networks expansion following the acquisition. 
The experience in this case is therefore contrary to the received wisdom that most mergers and 
acquisitions result in failure (see, for example, Havrylchyk, 2006).  
Moreover, considering the fact that Societele Generale had been operating in neighbouring 
Francophone West African countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ivory Cost and Senegal; it had 
the opportunity of learning about the Ghanaian banking industry due to proximity. In addition, the 
wholly owned subsidiary of Societele Generale by name Genetifec, had previously dealt with the 
corporate shareholders of the acquired bank (SSB Ltd). This alliance created the opportunity for a 
Francophone bank (Societele Generale) to carefully enter into merger and acquisition with an 
Anglophone Ghanaian Bank (SSB Ltd); where the former through prior experience managed to learn 
about the culture and legal system, as well as the general business and banking environment prevailing 
in Ghana. This suggests that the acquirer (Societele Generale) carefully selected a bank (SSB Ltd.) with 
a strong domestic base for acquisition. The Ghanaian government may also have exercised care in 
approving a foreign acquisition, in an attempt to avoid undermining the reforms.  
In examining the dynamic effects of cross-border merger and acquisition, the results suggests that 
neither the short-term (DYNAM_ST) nor the long-term (DYNAM_LT) effects of governance changes has 
any statistical significant effect on measured cost (in)efficiency. This is a clear indication that the 
persistence of new policies and strategies adopted by the merged and acquired bank can only be fully 
realised after a passage of time.  
4.2.2 Competition 
As a measure of competition, the universal banking dummy variable, UNIVERSAL, though statistically 
insignificant is found to be positively related with measured cost (in)efficiency. As mentioned earlier, 
some advocates of universal banking argue that by despecialising development financial institutions 
(DFIs) and commercial banks, competition could be stimulated. The result of this study is found to be 
inconsistent with this argument, which may stem from the fact that before the Ghanaian authority 
replaced the 3-pillar banking model (development, merchant and commercial banking) with universal 
banking in 2003, banks were already engaged with universal banking activities to some extent before 
their licenses were officially changed. One can argue from this perspective that financial liberalisation 
has had only a limited effect on competition, because to a large extent banks continue to practice what 
they used to before the reforms.  
4.2.3 Bank Size 
The result shows that measured cost (in)efficiency is inversely related to bank size, LOGASSETS. The 
coefficient is significant at the 1% level. Though the established literature offers no consensus on this 
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issue, there is evidence from this study that larger banks are significantly better at managing their costs 
than smaller institutions. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom which assumes that as banks 
grow larger, they are expected to control costs more effectively.  
 
5. Conclusion 
To examine the effects of financial liberalisation in Ghana, I empirically investigate the efficiency of its 
banking system from the period 1997 to 2008. Initially, I focus on the cost efficiency of banks to show 
the degree of progress that has been made in the banking sector after liberalisation. This is based on the 
expectation that greater cost efficiency should be associated with improved banking practices and better 
functioning institutions through the market structure and regulatory framework under which banks 
operate. The evidence of these results suggests the need for new foreign banks to develop 
understanding of the local conditions before they can adequately compete with their established foreign 
peers. Moreover, considering the high contribution to cost efficiency of the established foreign-owned 
banks and their long-term presence in Ghana, I suggest that the full benefits of foreign entry should 
materialise gradually over time. 
Also, it may take longer for smaller banks, especially foreign-owned banks that have recently entered 
the market, to compete with the long-established larger institutions that have used their knowledge of 
local conditions, coupled with the restructuring exercise, to improve their cost efficiency. However, I 
recommend that the banking market should remain open to entry, and allow for market-led 
consolidation of smaller institutions. With the minimum capital requirements raised by the monetary 
authority, and expected to be reached during the period 2009-2012, I envisage that further consolidation 
of smaller institutions is a likely future development.  
I therefore suggest that smaller banks, especially foreign-owned, could be encouraged to merge with 
established non-bank financial institutions that have adequate knowledge of local conditions. One such 
merger (UT Financial Services and BPI Bank) has been in progress at the time the writing of this paper 
was in progress. In the future, we expect the so-called “big giants”, which have long-term experience in 
the Ghanaian banking industry, to face enhanced levels of competition. From a policy point of view, I 
conclude that even a liberalised financial system cannot be characterised by perfect competition, 
because of the need for risk pooling. At best, a liberalised system can achieve a form of oligopolistic 
competition that tolerates some degree of functional inefficiency. Thus, the cost of financial services 
might decline less than it would under perfect competition.  
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Notes 
Note 1. See Berger and Humphrey (1997) for an excellent review of the established literature on the 
effects of financial deregulation on bank efficiency and productivity. 
Note 2. For a review of the literature on bank governance, see for example, the studies of Beck et al. 
(2005a, 2005b), Nakane and Weintraub (2005), Berger et al. (2005), and Williams and Nguyen (2005). 
Note 3. All the specialised banking institutions since the 1970s have accepted deposits and undertaken 
commercial banking activities before the replacement with universal banking occurred. 
Note 4. In the Ghanaian context, universal banking began in the year 2003, although banks have 
somewhat engaged in these activities before they had their license changed. 
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Appendix  
Table A.1. Robust Estimates of Bank Inefficiency Correlates 
Variable Parameter Coefficient Standard error T-statistic 
Constant      α0 -2.3030* 1.3063 -1.76 
Bank governance 
    
ENTRY_FOR      δ2 -0.5156** 0.1996 -2.58 
ENTRY_DOM      δ3 -0.5092** 0.2153 -2.36 
STATIC_FOR      δ4 -0.7304*** 0.2404 -3.04 
STATIC_DOM      δ5 -0.3873** 0.1970 -1.97 
STATIC_STA      δ6 -0.6277** 0.2460 -2.55 
SELECT_FOR      δ7 -0.7916*** 0.2556 -3.10 
DYNAM_ST      δ8 0.0227 0.1156 0.20 
DYNAM_LT      δ9 0.0012 0.0270 0.04 
Competition 
    
UNIVERSAL      δ10 0.0243 0.0404 0.60 
Bank Size 
    
LOGASSETS      δ11 -0.8043*** 0.0667 -12.05 
Macroeconomic 
    
DISRATE      δ12 -0.0017 0.0042 -0.41 
INFLATION      δ13 -0.0024 0.0018 -1.33 
Statistic 
    
Gamma       γ 0.9306*** 0.2149 4.3304 
LR-test      Ψ 47.3863*** 
  
No. of obs.      N 222 
  
Note. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
